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NOTES AND COMMENTS
IMPLEADER OF THE UNITED STATES FOR CONTRI-
BUTION UNDER THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
It is not an uncommon situation nowadays for a plaintiff, while riding as
a passenger in one vehicle, to be injured in a collision with another vehicle due
to the concurrent negligence of both drivers. Assuming that the vehicles were
being operated by employees acting within the scope of their employment, the
plaintiff may ordinarily sue either or both of the owners of the vehicles. And
if plaintiff chooses to sue only one of them, the defendant may implead the
other owner for the purpose of obtaining contribution, or he may bring a
separate action for that purpose later, if there is a substantive right to contri-
bution in the jurisdiction. If one of the vehicles involved in the collision
happened to be owned by the United States, do the private litigants have the
same choice of remedies? Of the lower federal courts passing on some phase
of the problem, some answered in the affirmative;' most in the negative.'
The Supreme Court of the United States has definitely settled these
questions in the recent decision of United States v. Yellow Cab Company,
argued and decided together with Capital Transit Company v. United States.!
The problem of impleader' as regards the United States has vexed the lower
federal courts since passage of the Federal Tort Claims Act in 1946. In the
Yellow Cab case, the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Burton,
has settled this problem and also nipped in the bud any question as to the
liability of the United States under the Tort Claims Act for contribution, where
local law allows it. Specifically, the Court held that the United States is liable
for contribution and may be impleaded for that purpose under the Tort Claims
Act.' Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas dissented without opinion.
THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
The Federal Tort Claims Act' waived the immunity of the United States
from actions for damages resulting from the torts of its employees while acting
1. Englehardt v. United States, 69 F Supp. 451 (D. Md. 1947); State of Md. v.
Manor Real Estate & Trust Co., 83 F. Supp. 91 (D. Md. 1949); see Bullock v. United
States, 72 F. Supp. 445 (D. N. J. 1947).
2. Donovan v. McKenna, 80 F. Supp. 691 (D. Mass. 1948); Uarte v. United
States, 7 F. R. D. 705 (D. S. D. Cal. 1948); Drummond v. United States, 78 F. Supp.
730 (D. E. D. Va. 1948) ; see Prechtl v. United States,84 F. Supp. 889 (D. W. D. N. Y.
1949); see also 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRA CE 516 (2d ed. 1948).
3. - U. S.--,71 S. Ct. 399 (Feb. 26, 1951).
4. Fed. R. Civ. P. 14 (a). Substantially the same problems arise as to thejoinder (see Fed. R. Civ. P. 20) of the United States with another as defendants. See
Brief for United States in the Yellow Cab case, supra, p. 11 n. 2.
5. Presumably, joinder of the United States with other defendants is allowable
also. See n. 4, supra.
. 6. 28 U. S. C. S§ 1346 (b), 1402 (b), 1504,2110, 2401 (b), 2402, 2311 (b), 2412
(c), 2671-2680. The Yellow Cab case was decided under the Act as originally passed,
but the 1948 revisors made only "minor changes ... in phraseology."
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within the scope of their employment. Its liability is stated to be "in accord-
ance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred."7 Thus,
the United States cannot be impleaded for contribution as a joint tortfeasor,
when the law governing the tort action is such as that in New York, since
contribution is allowed in that state only where the plaintiff has chosen to sue
the tortfeasors jointly A fortiori, the United States cannot be impleaded for
contribution in states which do not recognize contribution at all.' -
The Tort Claims Act provides that "the district courts ... shall have exclusive
jurisdiction of civil actions on claims- against the United States for money
damages ... for injury or loss of property, or personal injury .. . under cir-
cumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to
the claimant.. .to "The United States shall be liable ... in the same manner
and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.... ,"
It can readily be seen from the language quoted that the Tort Claims Act is a
waiver of sovereign immunity in the broadest terms1
LIABILITY OF THE UNITED STATES FOR CONTRIBUTION
The liability of the United States for contribution would seem to have
been clear from the sweeping language of the Act and its purpose. More than
magnanimity and a sense of justice prompted this legislation; it was also an
attempt by Congress to rid itself of the burden of legislating large numbers of
private settlements.1 ' However, many judges were reluctant to liberally con-
strue a statute which drastically changes the prior law. Those judges were
able to find comfort by pointing out that contribution is a claim "rooting from
7. 28 U. S. C. § 1346 (b).
8. Brown v. Cranston, 132 F. 2d 631 (2d Cir. 1942), holding the New York rule
to be a matter of substance under Erie R. R. v. Tompkins.
9. E.g. Ohio; see Royal Indemnity Co. v. Becker, 122 Ohio St. 582, 173 N. E. -194
(1930); Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Federal Express, Inc., 136 F. 2d 35 (6th Cir.
1943).
10. 28 U. S. C. §1346 (b).
11. Ibid.
12. The presence of the United States as a party in a suit involving private liti-
gants does not eliminate the necessity of diversity of citizenship between, the indi-
vidual parties needed to sustain jurisdiction in the federal courts. Wasjerman v.
Perugini, 173 F. 2d 305 (2d Cir. 1949); Dickens v. Jackson, 71 F. Supp. 753 (D. E. D.
N. Y. 1947); Precltl v. United States, 84 F. Supp. 889 (D. W. D. N. Y. 1 49). But
actions under the Tort Claims Act against the United States are not subject to the
usual minimum jurisdictional amount of S3,000. Bates v. United States, 74 F. Supp.
57 (D. Neb. 1948). It would seem that at least a $3,000 claim is necessary between
the individual parties where plaintiff has joined an individual defendant with the
United States. See Englehardt v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 451 (D. Mid. 1947) ;
see also Hulen, Suits on Tort Claims against the United States, 7 F. R. D. 689, 700(1948).
13. See United States v. Yellow Cab Co., supra, 71 S. Ct. at 404.
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principles of equity, not from principles of tort-liability."" They reasoned that
since statutes waiving sovereign immunity are to be strictly construed and con-
tribution does not sound in tort, such a claim is not within "the letter" of the
statute.
The attitude of the Supreme Court in the Yellow Cab case in rejecting
the obsolescent reasoning outlined above was foreshadowed in United States
v. Aetna Surety Co.'" There the Court said that the fact that a subrogee's
claim rested on "substantive equitable rights" did not preclude him from
recovery under the Tort Claims Act. And in answer to the Government's re-
liance, in that case as in the Yellow Cab case, on "the doctrine that statutes
waiving sovereign immunity must be strictly construed," Chief Justice Vinson
said: "We think that the congressional attitude in passing the Tort Claims Act
is more accurately reflected by Judge Cardozo's statment in Anderson v. Hayes
Construction Co., 243 N. Y. 140: 'The exemption of the sovereign from suit
involves hardship enough, where consent has been withheld. We are not to
add to its rigor by refinement of construction, where consent has been an-
nounced.' "" The Court's conclusion in the Yellow Cab case that liability for
contribution falls within the scope of the Tort Claims Act appears cogent.
IMPLEADER OF UNITED STATES FOR CONTRIBUTION
Whether the Tort Claims Act permitted the United States to be impleaded
in an action between private litigants involves greater difficulties, largely
procedural. It may be true that "such difficulties are not insurmountable,. 1 as
the Supreme Court put it, but they are more formidable than a casual reading
of the Yellow Cab opinion will disclose. No doubt, it was in tacit recognition
of such problems that the Court suggested that "if the Act develops unan-
ticipated complications, Congress can meet them."'"
In contending that impleader of the United States should not be allowed,
the Government attempted to find an analogy between the Tort Claims Act
and the Tucker Ace' (the counterpart of the Tort Claims Act for contract
14. Drummond v. United States, 78 F. Supp. 730, 731 (D. E. D. Va. 1948);
Stradley v. Capital Transit Co., 87 F. Supp. 94, 95 (D. D. C. 1949).
15. Stradley v. Capital Transit Co., supra n. 14. Accord, Drummond v. United
States, supra n. 14; Uarte v. United States, 7 F. R. D. 705 (D. S. D. Cal. 1948);
Donovan v. McKenna, 80 F. Supp. 691 (D. Mass. 1948) ; see Prechtl v. United States,
supra n. 12. at 8; see also the discussion of Judge Connally in Brown & Root v.
United States, 92, F. Supp. 257 (D. S. D. Texas 1950).
16. 338 U. S. 366 (1949).
17. Ibid. at 383.
18. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., supra, 71 S. Ct. at 407.
19. Ibid.
20. 28 U. S. C. § 1346 (a),491 etseq.
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claims) under which it has been held that the United States must be the sole
defendant."' Questionable legislative history reinforced this analogy. " But
the analogy is weak. The Tucker Act gave the district courts only concurrent
jurisdiction with the Court of Claims,"2 and therefore implicity carried over the
limitations of the latter court. The Tort Claims Act is more closely analogous
to the Suits in Admiralty Act " under which the United States may be impleaded
or joined as a joint tortfeasor.
Actions under the Tort Claims Act against the United States must be tried
without a jury.' In view of the fact that the Seventh Amendment to the Con-
stitution guarantees the right to trial by jury to individuals, the Government
argued that Congress contemplated suits against the United States alone.
But denial of a jury trial as to the claim against the United States is re-
concilable with the right to trial by jury as to the action between the private
litigants.' Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, separate verdicts can
be used," and if problems of admissibility of evidence require, separate trials
may be ordered by the court. "'
However, some knotty problems can be foreseen when two triers of fact
adjudicate the same issues. For example, the jury may find that the plaintiff
was free from contributory negligence, while the court finds to the contrary.
The individual defendant thus suffers an adverse judgment and if he is allowed
to recover contribution from the United States, such recovery would rest, at
least in part, on the jury verdict. If contribution is denied, then the United
States is absolved of liability for contribution on the ground that the third
party plaintiff is not liable, when he has already been held liable to the original
plaintiff. In effect, recovery against the United States as a third party de-
fendant requires findings by the court as well as the jury that the individual
defendant is liable.
Although no cases have been found on the point, it is submitted that the
jury's determination of damages should control in computing the amount of
21. United Stales v. Sherwood, 312 U. S. 584 (1941).
22. H. R. Rep. No. 1287, 79th Cong. 1st Sess., p. 5 (report on a prior similar bill
which did not pass).
23. See n. 20, supra.
24. 41 Stat. 525 as amended; see 46 U. S. C. S 741 et seq.
25. Hidalgo Ste'el Co. v. Moore & McCormack Co., 287 Fed. 331 (D. S. D. N. Y.
1923).
26. 28 U. S. C. S 2402.
27. It should be noted that trial by jury was not demanded by any of the private
litigants in the Yellow Cab case or in the Capital Transit case, supra.
28. Fed. R. Civ. P.-54 (b).
29. Fed. R. Civ. P. 42 (b).
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contribution to be recovered against the United States," once the court finds
liability of the United States to the original plaintiff.' With this exception,
it appears that discrepancies in fact-finding will be resolved against the
individual defendant."2
CONCLUSION
Where one party's liability is derivative from another's, and the asserted
liability of each is predicated on precisely the same fact situation, it might
appear, at first blush, to be anomalous that one should be held liable and the
other not, or both held liable but for different amounts. However, this happens
in other legal situations." Indeed it follows unavoidably from the nature of
fact-finding process that different fact-finders are not always consistent with
each other.'
The suggestion of the Supreme Court that complications can be met by
the Congress leads one to speculate about possible legislative solutions." The
number of situations in which divergent findings of fact may occur could be
minimized by restricting the availability of the jury. It might be provided that
impleader of the United States by an individual defendant constitutes a waiver
by him of any right to trial by jury in the action. But the right of a plaintiff
to a jury trial seemingly could not be constitutionally affected by the impleader
30. This should be so, at least in the absence of fraud, lack of good faith or
excessive verdict in the action against the individual tortfeasor, even where the United
States is sued for contribution in a separate action. See Consolidated Coach Corp.
v. Burge, 245 Ky. 631, 54 S. W. .d 16 (1932) ; see also Pinnix v. Griffin, 221 N. C. 348,
20 S. E. 2d 366 (1942). This would not offend the statutory prohibition of trial by
jury in actions against the United States because the evil at which the statute Is
aimed, namely the fear that juries might be too generous with the Government's
money, is largely absent.
See Gregory, Procedural Aspects of Securing Tort Contribution in the Injured
Plaintiff's Action, 47 HARv. L. REV. 209 (1933), especially at 214.
31. If this were not so, and the court and jury were to make findings of damages
in different amounts, the result would be that the third party plaintiff would receive
less than half of the amount which he was compelled to pay to the plaintiff. The
nature of contribution precludes him from ever receiving more than half. See
Gregory, op. cit. n. 30.
32. Of course, such difficulties will arise also where contribution is sought
against the United States in a separate action.
33. Elder v. N. Y. & Pa. Motor Express, Inc., 284 N. Y. 350, 31 N. E. 2d 188,
133 A. L. R. 176 (1940); Laskowski v. People's Ice Co., 203 Mich. 186, 168 N. W. 940,
2 A. L. R. 586 (1918); May Coal Co. v. Robinette, 120 Ohio St. 110, 165 N. E. 576,
64 A. L. R. 441 (1929).
34. "The power to weigh and determine facts carries with it a freedom of action
and decision inherent in itself." McSweeney v. Hammerlund Mfg. Co., 275 App. Div.
447, 450, 90 N. Y. S. 2d 347, 350 (3d Dept. 1949). See Judge Jerome Frank's ex-
cellent article, Say It With Music, 61 HARv. L. REv. 921 (1948).
35. It is not inconceivable that the judiciary could accomplish the same result
without legislative aid.
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of the United States by the individual defendant. However, if plaintiff then
amended his complaint to assert a claim against the United States, a waiver
of his right to a jury trial as against the individual defendant might be pro-
vided for."°
Further legislation would have been necessary to avoid injustices regard-
less of how the Supreme Court decided the issues in the Yellow Cab case. But
the alternative evils were not equal, and it is submitted that the approach of
Mr. Justice Burton for the Court is sound and the result has the greater just-
ness to commend it.
The questions of contribution and impleader for that purpose having now
been decided, the difficulties arising therefrom cannot long escape more
definite consideration by the courts, in view of the ever increasing volume of
litigation arising under the Federal Tort Claims Act."' Pending further action
by the Congress, private parties to such litigation must themselves examine
with care the problems suggested herein in order to avoid possible pitfalls and
to aid the courts in making judicial adjustments.
Henry Rose
FORUM NON CONVENIENS AND THE FEDERAL
EMPLOYERS LIABILITY ACT
In recent years there has been much speculation as to the power of a
state court to invoke the doctrine of forum non conveniens' in order to dismiss
suits based on foreign operative facts when the suit is brought under the
Federal Employers Liability Act.' The problem has been greatly clarified by
the recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in Missouri ex rel.
Southern Ry. v. Mayfield.' In order to understand the import and effect of
the Mayfield decision, it is important to review the problem prior to that case.
It is not within the scope of this comment to discuss the doctrine of forum
non conveniens as such, or the reasons for its application, but only to treat
the restrictions of the Federal Constitution and statutes on state courts in
applying the doctrine in actions properly brought under the FELA.
36. And in the joinder situation: Joinder of the United States with an individual
as defendants might be deemed a waiver of trial by jury on the part of the plaintiff
who joined them. Assertion of a :cross-claim for contribution by an individual de-
fendant against the United States, where they were joined by the plaintiff, could be
given the same effect.
37. See Collet, Federal Tort Claims Act, 8 F. R. D. 2 (1948).
1. The doctrine of forum non conveniens deals "with the discretionary power of
a court to decline to exercise a possessed jurisdiction whenever it appears that the
cause before ti may be more appropriately tried elsewhere." Blair, The Doctine of
Forum Non Conveniens In Anglo-American Law, 29 COL. L. Rav. 1 (1929).
2. 45 U. S. C. § 56 (1908).
3. 39 U.S. 918, 71 S. Ct. 1 (1950).
